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CASE COMMENT: MESSENGER V. GRUNER +JAHR
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the age of twelve, she had been groomed, plucked, dyed and
waxed in an attempt to sculpt her into a picture-perfect model, the
envy of all teenage American girls.' She endured countless castings for
fresh faces, affectionately referred to in the industry as "cattle-calls."
Each casting call filled with anxious pre-teens clinching their portfo-
lios. Finally, she received her big break: a photo spread with a national
magazine. After several days of primping and posing she would wait
months before she could see the fruits of her labor. When the issue
reached the newsstands, she was first in line - eager to flip the glossy
pages and see her own image staring back. Page 86, page 87, page...
her heart stopped as she realized that it was her image, but not repre-
senting the latest style or the hottest fad. Instead, the picture was illus-
trating an advice column and overlapped with the caption: "I got
drunk and slept with three guys...".
If a picture is worth a thousand words, then a picture that creates a
fictionalized implication is as damaging as a thousand words to the
same effect. The holding in Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing and Pub-
lishing,2 however, allows publishers to do with pictures what they are
forbidden to do with words.
Under New York's statutory right of privacy, publishers are prohib-
ited from the unauthorized use of a person's picture or name for ad-
vertising or trade purposes. 3  However, the publication of
"newsworthy" items is privileged and therefore exempt from the stat-
ute.4 Because of the competing interests of an individual's right of
privacy and freedom of the press, New York courts have placed limita-
tions on the "newsworthy" exception to the right of privacy statute. 5 In
order for the item to be "newsworthy" it must concern a matter of pub-
lic interest 6; cannot be an advertisement in disguise; 7 the use of the
1. This introduction is a fictional account, although loosely based on the young
girl in Messenger, it is not necessarily reflective of her actual experience.
2. Messenger v. Gruner +Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 94 N.Y.2d 436 (2000).
3. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney 2001).
4. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (1984).
5. Delan v CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1983).
6. Id.
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individual's name or photograph must bear a real relationship to the
newsworthy issue;8 and its use cannot create a substantially fictional-
ized implication. 9
The holding in Messenger creates a distinction between the use of
an individual's photograph to illustrate a newsworthy article and the
use of an individual's name within a newsworthy article. The holding
protects those who generate fictionalized implications through the use
of photographs by permitting them to hide behind the shield of the"newsworthy" exception. This case comment argues that the inten-
tional creation of such fictions should automatically defeat such a
shield and expose those responsible to liability under New York Civil
Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 ("CRL 50-51").
Part II of this case comment examines the facts and procedural
history of Messenger. It also provides a background of the right of pri-
vacy in New York and explains how the newsworthy exception limits
that right. Part III analyzes the court's decision in Messenger. Part IV
calls for the application of the substantial fictionalization exception to
all published works, including photographs, to remedy such violations
of privacy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Right of Privacy in New York
There is no common-law right of privacy in New York.10 In 1902,
7. Griffen v. Med. Soc'y of N.Y., 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1939).
8. Thompson v. Close-up, Inc., 98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1950).
9. Finger v. Omni Publ'n Int'l., 77 N.Y.2d 138 (1990).
10. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902); Wojtowicz v.
Delacorte Press, 43 N.Y. 2d 858, 860 (1978). For a general discussion of the common
law right of privacy, see Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis stated that "[I]n very early times, the law gave a
remedy only for physical interference with life and property, for trespasses vi et
armis.. .Gradually, the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life
has come to mean the right to enjoy life, - the right to be let alone; the right to liberty
secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term "property" has grown to
comprise every form of possession - intangible, as well as tangible." In 1960, Dean
Prosser furthered the idea of a common law right of privacy when he categorized the
four types of invasions of personal privacy which were later adopted by Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652A-E. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960). The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines those categories as the unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another; the appropriation of the other's name or likeness; un-
reasonable publicity given to the other's private life; and publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public. This tort action for invasion of pri-
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in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. 1 ", a company that manufactured
and sold flour used a photograph of a little girl on their advertisements
without her (or her parents') permission.1 2 The New York Court of
Appeals held that it could not award the young plaintiff the injunction
she requested due to the lack of a common law right of privacy, but
invited the legislature to create a statutory cause of action for future
plaintiffs who may find themselves similarly situated.1 3
In 1909, the New York Legislature responded with CRL 50-51,14
which create a limited statutory right of privacy. 15 CRL 50-51 makes it
a misdemeanor to use a person's name, portrait or picture for "the
purpose of trade or advertising" without first obtaining his/her
consent. 16
B. Newsworthy Exception
CRL 50-51 is not applicable to "newsworthy" articles because the
courts do not interpret the publication of such articles as being for the"purpose of trade."' 7 In Delan v CBS,18 the defendant aired a news
vacy is currently recognized in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connect-
icut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625A (Reporter's Notes 1974).
11. 171 N.Y. 538 (1902).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 546 ("The legislative body could very well interfere and arbitrarily pro-
vide that no one should be permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the picture or
the name of another for advertising purposes without his consent.").
14. N.Y. Civ RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2001).
15. Id. at § 50: A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes,
or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or ifa minor, his or her parent
or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 51: Action for injunction and for damages: Any person whose name, portrait,
picture or voice is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an
equitable action in the supreme court of this state against ... [them]... to prevent and
restrain the use thereof, and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sus-
tained by reason of such use.
16. Id. Oklahoma and Virginia also have statutes covering invasion of privacy,
dealing with appropriation of the other's name or likeness. See also VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-40 (2002); 21 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 839.1 (2002).
17. See Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d at 181.
18. Delan by Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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segment on the institutionalization of the mentally disabled. The
broadcast included the plaintiffs name and image. 19 The appellate
division refused to hold the defendant liable under CRL 50-51 because
it did not consider the broadcast of the plaintiff's name and image to
be for the "purposes of trade." The Delan court explained that New
York courts, fearful of curtailing the First Amendment rights of free
press, consider reports concerning matters of public interest to be priv-
ileged and therefore "not within the ambit of the terms 'purpose of
trade."' 20
In Stephano v. News Group Publications,2 ' a professional model sued
a publisher for using his photographs without his permission. The
model had posed for a fashion spread to appear in the September is-
sue of New York Magazine.22 The magazine printed photographs from
that shoot in the August and September issues. The model sued the
magazine for invasion of privacy on the theory that the photos, as they
appeared in the August issue, had been used for advertising purposes
without his consent.23 The court found for the defendant publisher
and held that even if a publisher uses a person's name or likeness with
the intent to increase circulation of its publication, the person's name
or likeness has not necessarily been used for trade purposes within the
meaning of CRL 50-51.24 "It is the content of the article and not the
defendant's motive or primary motive to increase circulation which de-
termines whether it is a newsworthy item, as opposed to a trade usage,
under the Civil Rights Law." 25 The court concluded that the availabil-
ity of the jacket the plaintiff modeled was a matter of sufficient public
interest and therefore the article was newsworthy and subject to
privilege. 26
1. What is Newsworthy?
New York courts have defined the term "newsworthy" very broadly.
Descriptions of actual events, such as weddings27 and halftime shows at
19. Id.
20. Id. at 613.
21. Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d 174.
22. Id. at 179.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 184-85.
25. Id. at 185.
26. Id.
27. Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135 (1985).
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sporting events28 are considered newsworthy. Generally, articles about
any subject of public interest fall within the newsworthy category. 29
From descriptions of fashion trends30 to guides to nude beaches,3' a
wide variety of subjects have been deemed newsworthy by the courts.
2. Limitations on the Newsworthy Exception
There are limitations to the newsworthy exception. First, use of
the name, photograph, or picture must have a real relationship with
the article with which it was used in conjunction. 32 Second, the article
cannot be an advertisement in disguise. 33 Third, the use cannot be
overly infected with substantial fictionalization or falsification.3 4
a. Real Relationship Limitation
When a court determines that there is no real relationship be-
tween the use of the plaintiff's name or picture and the article it is
used to illustrate, the defendant cannot use the newsworthy exception
as a defense. In Thompson v. Close-Up, Inc.,35 the defendant published
the plaintiff's photograph in conjunction with an article entitled "Deal-
ers in Dope".36 The caption read: "Mary Pennochio: Her husband
had been a partner of Lucky Luciano. When he was taken out of circu-
lation, she carried on his work."37 The court found that the plaintiff in
the photograph was neither Mary Pennochio, nor had she ever been
involved in drug deals. 38 Because the photograph had no real relation
28. Gautier v. Pro-Football Inc., 304 N.Y. 354 (1952).
29. Beverly v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., 78 N.Y.2d 745, 751(1991); Stephano, 64
N.Y.2d 174.
30. See Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d 174; Abdelrazig v. Essence Communications, 639
N.Y.S.2d 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
31. Creel v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 496 N.Y.S.2d 219 (App. Div. 1985).
32. See Murray v. New York Magazine Co., 27 N.Y.2d 406, 409 (1971); Thompson
v. Close-up, Inc., 98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 1950).
33. Murray, 27 N.Y.2d at 409.
34. See Fils-Aime v. Enlightenment Press, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1986); Davis v.
High Soc'y Mag, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982); Pagan v New York Herald Tribune, Inc.,
301 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (1969); Lerman v Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (1984); Spahn
v. Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324 (1966).
35. Thompson v. Close-Up, Inc., 99 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup.Ct. 1950), affd, 98 N.Y.S.2d
300 (1950).
36. Id. at 865.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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to the article, the court held that the defendant was liable under the
right of privacy statute. 39
Despite Mary Pennochio's success in establishing a lack of a real
relationship between the article and her photograph, the New York
courts seem to accept a broad array of "real relationships". In the Fin-
ger,40 Arrington,4 1 and Murray42 line of cases, the New York Court of
Appeals showed how little it took to fulfill the relationship
requirement.
In Finger, a magazine article entitled "Caffeine and Fast Sperm"
was illustrated with a photograph of the plaintiffs family.43 The plain-
tiff argued that although the article was "newsworthy", their photo-
graph bore no real relationship to the article because their children
had not been conceived by "in vitro fertilization or any other artificial
means, and that they never participated in the caffeine-enhanced re-
production research" described in the article. 4 4 The New York Court
of Appeals found a real relationship existed because "It]he theme of
fertility is reasonably reflect in the . .. images used - six healthy and
attractive children with their parents. 45
Arrington dealt with the nonconsensual publication of the plain-
tiff's photograph to illustrate a New York Times Article entitled "The
Black Middle Class: Making It." 46 The plaintiff did not contest that "by
external and objective criteria" he may be perceived to be a member of
"the black middle class." 47 Instead, he contended that he did not asso-
ciate himself with the "black middle class" depicted by the article (as
he read it) as "materialistic, status-conscious and frivolous individuals
without any sense of moral obligation to those of their race who are
economically less fortunate. '48 The New York Court of Appeals, con-
cluded that the plaintiffs asserted lack of a real relationship amounted"to his conviction that his views are not consonant with those of the
39. Id.
40. Finger v. Omni Publ'n Int'l, 77 N.Y.2d 138 (1990).
41. Arrington v. The New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982).
42. Murray, 27 N.Y.2d 406.
43. Finger, 77 N.Y.2d 138.
44. Id. at 142.
45. Id.
46. Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d at 435.
47. Id. at 440.
48. Id.
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author."4 9 The court held this was not enough to defeat the news-
worthy exception to CRL 50-51. 5 0
In Murray, the plaintiff was photographed wearing an "Irish" hat, a
green bow tie and a green pin while watching the St. Patrick's Day
Parade in Manhattan. 5' The picture was used to illustrate an article in
New York Magazine entitled "The Last of the Irish Immigrants." The
court held that it could not be said that the plaintiff's photograph was
not related to the subject matter of the article which "dealt with the
contemporary attitudes of Irish-Americans in New York City, referred
to the gaiety of the St. Patrick's Day festivities and included comments
about the parade."52
b. Advertisement in Disguise Limitation
Despite appearing as an otherwise newsworthy piece, a court may
determine that an article is in fact an advertisement in disguise. In
Griffin v. Medical Society of New York, 53 the defendant published a photo-
graph of the plaintiff in its medical magazine. The photograph illus-
trated an article by defendant doctors on a condition known as saddle
nose. 54 Defendants' contention that the photograph was solely used
for scientific purposes was not enough to sustain a motion to dismiss.
The court found that it could be inferred from the complaint that the
doctors used the photo to advertise their handiwork and therefore vio-
lated CRL 50-51. 5 5 The court found that the article, although in a sci-
entific publication, may in fact be merely an advertisement in
disguise. 56
c. Substantial Fictionalization Limitation
Courts have found that use of a plaintiffs name or picture may be
so infected with fiction as to defeat the newsworthy exception to CRL
50-51. In Binns v. Vitagraph Company of America,57 the defendant pro-
duced a film that depicted the real life event involving the plaintiffs
rescue of hundreds of people. The plaintiff complained that the de-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Murray, 27 N.Y.2d at 407.
52. Id. at 409.
53. Griffin v. Medical Soc'y of State of N.Y., 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1939).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 210 N.Y. 51 (1913).
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fendant had used his name and likeness for the purposes of trade and
advertising without his permission. The court found that, even though
the film depicted an actual event, it was so inaccurate that its purpose
could only be construed as one of entertainment, not of education. 58
Therefore, the court held that Binns' likeness had been used for the
purposes of trade.5 9
Similarly, in Spahn v. Julian Messner, the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that the defendant's children's book about the plaintiff was
so "infected with material and substantial falsification" as to be actiona-
ble under CRL 50-51.6o The book included dialogue fabricated by the
author as well as fictional incidents in the plaintiffs life.61
C. Background of Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing and Publishing
1. Facts
Jamie Messenger, a 14-year-old aspiring model living in Florida,
posed for a photo spread to appear in Young and Modern (YM) maga-
zine. 62 YM magazine, published by the Defendant Gruner + Jahr,
targets teen-aged girls with articles and advice columns on topics such
as beauty and romance.63 Messenger consented to be photographed,
but her parents did not sign a written consent form . 6 4 Messenger
claimed that the defendant "induced her to pose for photographs
under the false pretense that they would be published in a 'nice little
story' about 'couples.' '65
Three full-color photographs of Messenger were published in the
June/July 1995 issue and illustrated the "Love Crisis" column.66 The
column featured a letter from a 14-year-old who identified herself as
58. Id. at 58.
59. Id.
60. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 127 (1967).
61. Id. at 129.
62. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 437.
63. YM magazine was launched in 1954 and its circulation for 2000 was 2,276,939.
The publisher's website gives the following description of YM: "Over nine million teen-
ager [sic] turn to YM every month for cutting-edge editorial, inspirational ideas and
honest advice they can't get anywhere else on the topics that concern them the most.
From their looks to their love lives, YM gives them the facts they need to make the best
choices - for now, and for the future." See http://www.guj.de/english/products/
magazines/3ym-eng.html.
64. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 446.
65. Brief for Respondent at 12; Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d 436 (No. 98-7767).
66. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 437.
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"Mortified."67 "Mortified" confessed that she had sexual intercourse
with her 18-year-old boyfriend and his friends after she got drunk at a
party.68 A pull-out quotation appearing above the column in bold type
stated "I got trashed and had sex with three guys." 69
The first picture is of Messenger sitting curled up on a couch with
her head resting in her hand. The caption reads, "Wake up and face
the facts: You made a pretty big mistake." 70 The second picture shows
a humiliated looking Messenger turning away from a group of teenage
boys. The caption reads, "Don't try to hide-just ditch him and his
buds."71 Finally, a close-up of Messenger with a worried expression
carries the caption, "Afraid you're pregnant? See a doctor."7 2 In all
three photographs, Messenger's face is easily identifiable.
2. Procedural History
Messenger initiated her action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.73 She claimed defamation, neg-
ligence, libel, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress
as well as violation of §§ 50-51 of the New York Civil Rights law. The
court applied Florida law to Messenger's claims of defamation, negli-
gence, libel, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress
after determining that Florida had a more significant relationship to
the dispute with respect to those causes of action.74 Florida law pro-
vides a single publication or single cause of action rule which restricts a
plaintiff in bringing only one cause of action when the defendant's
alleged wrongdoing was a single action of tortious conduct.75 Thus,
the court dismissed all of the claims except for the defamation claim,
67. Sally Lee, Love Crises, YOUNG AND MODERN, June/July 1995, at 22.
68. The entire text of the letter reads, "Dear Sally, I'm 14 and I started sleeping
with my 18-year-old boyfriend about four months ago. Recently he invited me over to
his house for a party, but when I got there it turned out that the "party" was just him
and two of his friends. They kept giving me beers, and I ended up getting really drunk
and having sex with all of them! Even worse, I heard them laughing about it at school
the next day. I feel so dirty and ashamed. How could I have been so stupid? -
Mortified".
69. See Lee, supra note 67, at 22.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Messenger v. Gruner +Jahr Printing & Publ'g, No. 97 Civ. 0136 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
21, 1998).
74. Id.
75. Id.
2003]
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which it found to be the plaintiffs principle cause of action and the
right of privacy claim, which the court found deserved separate atten-
tion. 76 The court then dismissed her defamation action because Mes-
senger did not give proper notice to Gruner +Jahr of her intention to
file suit as required by Florida's defamation statute.77
As to Messenger's remaining CRL 50-51 claim, the defendant
moved for summary judgment on two grounds.78 First, despite the fact
that both parties to the suit briefed and argued the motion on the
assumption that New York law governed the alleged commercial or
trade use of the plaintiffs photographs, the defendant argued that the
court should sua sponte apply Florida law and find that the single publi-
cation or single cause of action rule precluded plaintiff from bringing
the CRL 50-51 claim as well.79 The court ultimately rejected the defen-
dant's invitation to apply Florida law and further held that the single
publication/single cause of action rule did not bar Messenger from
bringing this commercial misappropriation claim. The court found
that the privacy claim went "well beyond the injury to reputation that
lies at the heart of her defamation claim" and therefore, allowing her
to bring it did not defeat the rule's purpose of "prevent[ing] plaintiffs
from circumventing a valid defense to defamation by recasting essen-
tially the same facts into several different causes of action all meant to
compensate for the same harm. 8 0
Second, the defendant argued for summary judgment on the
ground that the fictionalization exception no longer exists under New
York law.8 1 Although the court acknowledged that the defendant had
a debatable point,8 2 the court denied the defendant's motion.8 3
The jury found for Messenger on the CRL 50-51 claim, and
awarded her $100,000 in compensatory damages.84 The defendant
moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50(b)8 5 or in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant
76. Id.
77. See FLA. STAT. ch. 770.01 (1996).
78. Messenger by Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr USA Publ'g, 994 F. Supp. 525, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
79. Id. at 529.
80. Id. at 531.
81. Id.
82. Messenger, 994 F.Supp. at 529.
83. Id. at 532.
84. Messenger by Messenger v Gruner +Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 175 F.3d 262, 263
(2d Cir. 1999).
85. Id.
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to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.86 In an unpublished opinion,
the trial court denied both of the motions. 87
The defendant appealed the verdict to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.8 8 The Court of Appeals determined
that the law in New York was unsettled with respect to "whether a plain-
tiff can recover under New York's statutory right of privacy when a pub-
lisher uses the plaintiff's image in a substantially fictionalized way to
illustrate a newsworthy piece."8 9 The court decided to certify the fol-
lowing questions to the New York Court of Appeals:
1. May a plaintiff recover under New York Civil Rights
Law §§ 50 and 51 where the defendant used the
plaintiff's likeness in a substantially fictionalized way
without the plaintiffs consent, even if the defen-
dant's use of the image was in conjunction with a
newsworthy column?
2. If so, are there any additional limitations on such a
cause of action that might preclude the instant
case?90
The certification of the questions was accepted by the New York
Court of Appeals on June 8, 1999. 9 1 On February 17, 2000, the New
York court answered the first question in the negative and therefore
did not consider the second question. 92
Accordingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the
case. 93 Messenger's writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court was denied on October 2, 2000. 9 4
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IN MESSENGER
The New York Court of Appeals began its analysis in Messenger by
restarting several basic principles it believed governed interpretation
of CRL 50-51.95 First, courts should narrowly construe the statute and
86. Id. at 263-64.
87. Id. at 64.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 266.
91. Messenger v Gruner +Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 93 N.Y. 2d 948 (1999).
92. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 436.
93. Messenger v. Gruner +Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 208 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000).
94. Messenger v Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 531 U.S. 818 (2000).
95. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 441.
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strictly limit its application to "nonconsensual commercial appropria-
tions of the name, portrait or picture of a living person."9 6 Second,
courts must recognize the newsworthy exception to the statute.97 Fi-
nally, the courts have traditionally construed the definition of "news-
worthy" very broadly.9 8
The New York Court of Appeals articulated a broad three-part test
for evaluating whether the use of a photograph fits under the news-
worthy exception. 99 First, the photographs must illustrate a news-
worthy article. 10 0 Second, there must be a real relationship between
the photographs and the article. 10 ' Third, the article cannot be an
advertisement in disguise. 10 2
Messenger conceded that the article in fact met the elements of
this limited test.10 3 First, the Love Crisis column in YM was, in fact,
newsworthy because it is "informative and educational regarding teen-
age sex, alcohol abuse and pregnancy-plainly matters of public con-
cern." 10 4 Second, Messenger conceded that the pictures bore a real
relationship to the article. 10 5 Finally, Messenger did not allege that the
article was merely an advertisement in disguise.' 0 6
Messenger argued that the substantial fictionalization limitation
on the newsworthy exception, as articulated in Binns'0 7 and Spahn,'08
applied in this case. Messenger argued that because the photographs,
juxtaposed with the article, created a substantially fictionalized implica-
96. Id. (quoting Finger v. Omni Publs Intl., 77 N.Y.2d 138, 141).
97. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 441.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 446.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 444.
104. Id.
105. Id. It is unclear to this author why the plaintiff conceded this point. The
Court of Appeals opinion does not provide any detail into what the "real relationship"
between the photograph and the article was. The plaintiffs brief to the New York
Court of Appeals conceded that the real relationship test "[was] not immediately at
issue in this case." However, the brief contained the following footnote: "We do note,
however, that there is at least a credible argument that can be advanced that Jamie's
pictures do not bear a "real relationship" to the article in issue... In the case at bar the
only similarity thatJamie has with the theme of the article -teenage sex and drug abuse
- was that she was a teenager. Otherwise she was unfairly and falsely induced to
pose..." Brief for Respondent at 9, Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d 436 (No. 98-7767).
106. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 444.
107. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51 (1913).
108. 21 N.Y.2d 124 (1967).
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tion, the defendant was not entitled to the protection of the news-
worthy exception.1° 9 However, the court held that because the
defendant's use of Messenger's photographs met the court's three-part
test, she could not recover under CRL 50-51, "regardless of any false
implication that might be reasonably drawn from the use of her photo-
graphs to illustrate the article."""
In its holding, the court eliminated the fictionalization limitation
on the newsworthy exception to the right of privacy statute in cases
where an individual's photographs are used to illustrate articles. The
court recognized a clear distinction between cases interpreting CRL
50-51 that dealt with photographs used to illustrate newsworthy articles
and those cases dealing with other types of publications." ' I
The majority acknowledged that ". . .an article may be so infected
with fiction, dramatization or embellishment that it cannot be said to
fulfill the purpose of the newsworthiness exception." 2 The court
found that cases such as Binns'1 5 and Spahn,1 14 were clearly distin-
guishable in that they were "nothing more that attempts to trade on
the person of Warren Spahn orJohn Binns."1 15 Binns1 6 and Spahn 17
involved defendants who "invented biographies of plaintiffs' lives",
whereas, the column in YM was newsworthy, as conceded by the
Plaintiff. 118
The court found that the Finger,"19 Arrington, 120 and Murray12 1
line of cases correctly stated the rule that applied to unauthorized and
allegedly false use of an individual's photograph to illustrate a news-
worthy article.1 22 That rule, as articulated above, does not provide for
a substantial fictionalization limitation.
Because of its emphasis on these cases, the court refused to apply
the substantial fictionalization limitation to the use of photographs in
109. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 444.
110. Id.
111. Id. at446.
112. Id.
113. Binns, 210 N.Y. 51.
114. Spahn, 21 N.Y.2d 124.
115. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 446.
116. Binns, 210 N.Y. 51.
117. Spahn, 21 N.Y.2d 124.
118. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 446.
119. Finger, 77 N.Y.2d 138.
120. Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d 433.
121. Murray, 27 N.Y.2d 406.
122. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 446.
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conjunction with an article, even if such use could reasonably be
viewed as falsifying or fictionalizing the plaintiff's relation to the
article. 123
The dissent in Messenger argued that "New York law supports a
more nuanced and generous approach to the applicability of this now
largely immobilized statute that is functionally realistically foreclosed
by [this] ruling."'124 The dissent argued that the newsworthy exception
was being stretched too far when it protected a publisher, such as the
defendant, that "soldered together and dramatized" the link between
the plaintiff and the content of the article. 125
IV. DOING THROUGH PICTURES WHAT CANNOT BE DONE
THROUGH WORDS
The holding in Messenger effectively defeats an integral purpose of
CRL 50-51 by inventing a legal distinction, for the purposes of liability,
between the unauthorized use of a person's photograph and the unau-
thorized use of a person's name. In effect, the court found that the
substantial fictionalization limitation applied to the use of an individ-
ual's name but not to the use of an individual's photograph; thus, the
court effectively held that a publisher could do through pictures what
it could not do through words. The language of the statute and the
practical effect of such a distinction both support the equal protection
of an individual's name and photograph.
The court saw "no inherent tension between the Finger-Arrington-
Murray line and Binns-Spahn line."'126 The court distinguished Fin-
ger,127 Arrington,128 and Murray129 which all dealt with "the unautho-
rized and allegedly false and damaging use of plaintiffs photographs
to illustrate newsworthy articles" from Binns130 and Spahn 31 which in-
volved the "invent[ion] [of] biographies of plaintiffs' lives."'1 32
Due to this distinction, the court concluded that a plaintiff whose
picture is used to illustrate a newsworthy article cannot recover under
123. Id. at 443.
124. Id. at 456.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 446.
127. Finger, 77 N.Y.2d 138.
128. Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d 433.
129. Murray, 27 N.Y.2d 406.
130. Binns, 210 N.Y. 51.
131. Spahn, 21 N.Y.2d 124.
132. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 446.
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CRL 50-51 so long as the picture bears a real relationship to the article
and "the article is not an advertisement in disguise."1 33 The court ad-
ded that this is true "even where a plaintiff's photograph, when juxta-
posed with an article, could reasonably have been viewed as falsifying
or fictionalizing plaintiff's relation to the article." 3 4 In contrast,"under Binns and Spahn an article may be so infected with fiction,
dramatization or embellishment that it cannot be said to fulfill the pur-
pose of the newsworthiness exception." 3 5
Despite the court's exercise in line-drawing, CRL 50-51 makes no
distinction between the use of an individual's name and the use of her
picture or portrait. To the contrary, it forbids the use of "the name,
portrait or picture of any living person" without that person's con-
sent.'3 6 An individual's name and photograph are not given separate
attention but instead grouped together for the purposes of defining
what is protected by CRL 50-51.
Furthermore, damage created through words may be no greater
than that created through pictures. Consider the following. If, instead
of using her picture to illustrate the column, YM magazine used Jamie
Messenger's name in the article, she could have recovered under CRL
50-51. Perhaps the article would read something like, 'Jamie Messen-
ger, a 14-year-old high-school student at Washington High School re-
cently got drunk and had sex with three guys at the same time. Now
she is worried that she is pregnant." The subject of the article would
be the same as in the actual Messenger case, namely teenage sex, alco-
hol abuse and pregnancy, and therefore "newsworthy." The "real rela-
tionship" between the use of Messenger's name and the subject of the
article would again exist in the same respect as it did in the actual case
involving her photographs. However, Jamie Messenger would arguably
be able to recover under CRL 50-51 in this hypothetical because the
use of her name in this manner would make the article "so infected
with fiction...that it cannot be said to fulfill the purpose of the new-
sworthiness exception."1 3 7
The jury at the trial level in the Messenger case found that the jux-
taposition of Messenger's pictures with the article created the substan-
tially fictionalized implication that Jamie Messenger was in fact the
133. Id. at 447, n.3.
134. Id. at 443.
135. Id. at 446.
136. N.Y. Civ RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2001).
137. Messenger, 94 N.Y.2d at 446.
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young girl writing to the advice column. 138 Therefore, the above ex-
ample of using her actual name in the article would create the same
damage that was in fact created by using her photograph. It is illogical
to draw a distinction between the two mediums when considering CRL
50-51 when they both in fact result in the same injury.
V. THE FICTIONALIZATION EXCEPTION SHOULD APPLY TO ALL
PUBLISHED PHOTOGRAPHS
The use of photographs in conjunction with "newsworthy" articles
to create substantially fictionalized implications in effect negates the
relationship between the photograph and the article and destroys the"newsworthy" aspect of the article itself. In order to protect privacy
rights and preserve the creditworthiness of the press, the substantial
fictionalization exception should apply to all published photographs.
The exception should not be used to provide publishers with a free
pass to in effect create falsifications.
Because New York only recognizes rights of privacy established by
statute, the legislature must step forward to protect individuals from
the unauthorized use of their photographs in a manner that creates
falsifications that are not permitted to be created by words.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Messenger permits a publisher to do through pic-
tures what it cannot do through words, namely create a substantially
fictionalized implication without consequences. Under Messenger, a
publisher can use photographs to create false implications to be rea-
sonably drawn from their juxtaposition to an article as long as the
printed article itself did not state the false implication as fact. The
court's decision to apply different tests to the use of one's name and
the use of one's photograph ignores the language of CRL 50-51 and
the damage caused to an individual due to the unauthorized use of her
photograph in a way that creates a substantially fictionalized implica-
tion about her. Messenger's holding effectively allows publishers to do
through pictures what they are forbidden to do through words.
Alina Raines
138. Id. at 456.
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